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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ILLINOIS
DRAFT CARD BURNING ACT
Robert J. Dyer III*
A person who knowingly destroys or mu-
tilates a valid registration certificate or
any other valid certificate issued under the
Federal 'Military Selective Service Act of
1967' shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or be imprisoned in the peniten-
tiary for not more than five years, or both.
Illinois H.B. 2597, enacted on August 20, 1968.
Any person ...who forges, alters, know-
ingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in
any manner changes any such [Selective
Service] certificate shall, upon conviction,
be fined not to exceed $10,000, or be im-
prisoned for no more than five years, or
both....
50 U.S.C.A. §462(b), Universal Military Training Act
(1948, Amended 1965 and 1967)
[Italics indicate 1965 Amendments].
1. Introduction
Pre-emption, a doctrine based on Article VI of the United States Consti-
tution (the "Supremacy Clause"), considers ". . . the validity of state laws
in the light of . . .Federal laws touching on the same subject.", Where
state and federal laws embrace the same subject matter the question is
whether Congress intended to preclude state legislative participation in the
area or to allow concurrent power. 2 If Congress did intend to preclude
state legislation on the subject, the state law must be struck down as a
violation of Article VI. Where there is no directly expressed Congressional
intent the Court must discover that intent, and as Justice Black noted in
Hines v. Davidowitz: "There is not-and from the nature of the prob-
lem there cannot be -any rigid formula or rule which can be used as a
*Mr. Dyer is a member of the staff of Prospectus.
1 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 at 67, (1941).
2 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 at 223, (1946).
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universal pattern to determine the meaning and purpose of every Act of
Congress." 3
Nevertheless, the Court has developed several guidelines to ascertain
Congressional intent in a particular area. These guidelines, enunciated pri-
marily in cases involving the Commerce Clause, 4 were summarized into
three succinct tests and applied to a criminal statute in Pennsylvania v.
Nelson.5 In that case the Supreme Court held a Pennsylvania sedition law
void because the sedition area had been pre-empted by the federal govern-
ment. The tests established by the Supreme Court in Nelson were whether:
"First, '[t]he scheme of federal regulation [is] so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to sup-
plement it"6; "Second, the federal statutes 'touch a field in which the fed-
eral interest is so dominant that the federal system [must] be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject' "7; and, "Third,
the enforcement of state . . . acts presents a serious danger of conflict
with the administration of the federal program."s An analysis of the
Illinois "Draft Card Burning" Act, in light of these three tests, requires
the conclusion that the Illinois law falls within an area pre-empted by the
federal government and is therefore unconstitutional.
I. Pervasiveness of Federal Regulation
In the Nelson case three federal statutes directed to the sedition and
subversion area 9 were cited by the Court as evidence of pervasive federal
regulation sufficient to pre-empt state regulation in the field. The Court
reached this conclusion despite the fact that the state and federal statutes
were worded dissimilarly and aimed at somewhat different crimes.1 0 By
3 312 U.S. at 67.
4 See Mr. Justice Douglas' history of the doctrine in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.
331 U.S. at 229.
5 350 U.S. 497 (1956). This case "... is apparently the first case in which the Supreme
Court has held that a federal criminal statute, not involving a regulatory scheme
under the Commerce Clause, supercedes, in the absence of conflicting provisions,
the enforceability of a concurrent state criminal statute." Cramton, Pennsyl-
vania v. Nelson: A Case Study in Federal Pre-Emption, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 85,
86, (1958).
6 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. at 502, Brackets in original.
7 Id., at 504, Brackets in original.
8 Id., at 505.
9 Id., at 499-504. The Statutes in question: THE SMITH ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1921):
THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT, 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1950); THE COMMUNIST CONTROL
ACT, 50 U.S.C. § 841 (1954).
10 Compare for example the then Pennsylvania Sedition Law which included, inter alia:
PENNSYLVANIA PENAL CODE § 207
The word "sedition," as used in this section
shall mean:
Any writing, publication, printing, cut, cartoon,
utterance, or conduct, either individually or in
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connection or combination with any other per-
son, the intent of which is:
(a) To make or cause to be made any outbreak
or demonstration of violence against this State
or against the United States.
(b) To encourage any person to take any
measures or engage in any conduct with a view
of overthrowing or destroying or attempting to
overthrow or destroy, by any force or show or
threat of force, the Government of this State
or of the United States.
(c) To incite or encourage any person to
commit any overt act with a view to bringing
the Government of this State or of the United
States into hatred or contempt.
(f) Any writing, publication, printing, cut, car-
toon, or utterance which advocates or teaches
the duty, necessity, or propriety of engaging
in crime, violence, or any form of terrorism,
as a means of accomplishing political reform
or change in government.
Sedition shall be a felony. Whoever is guilty
of sedition shall, upon conviction thereof, be
sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding ten thou-
sand dollars ($10,000), or to undergo imprison-
ment not exceeding twenty (20) years, or both.
with the United States Code
18 U.S.C. § 2385
Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates,
abets, advises, or teaches the duty, necessity,
desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or
destroying the government of the United States
or the government of any State, Territory, Dis-
trict or Possession thereof, or the government
of any political subdivision therein, by force or
violence, or by the assassination of any officer
of any such government; or
Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or
destruction of any such government prints,
publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells, distrib-
utes, or publicly displays any written or printed
matter advocating, advising, or teaching the
duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of
overthrowing or destroying any government in
the United States by force or violence or at-
tempts to do so;
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or im-
prisoned not more than ten years, or both, and
shall be ineligible for employment by the
United States or any department or agency
thereof, for the five years next following his
conviction.
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contrast, the federal and Illinois "Draft Card Burning" laws are identical
in language and in the conduct prohibited. Moreover, the federal statute
in this area is augmented by a Selective Service Regulation providing that
"Every person is required to ...have in his possession at all times his
registration certificate .. .prepared by his local board."]1
The Supreme Court, in a recent case 12 challenging the constitutionality
of the federal prohibition of draft card destruction, considered the rela-
tionship between the federal statute and the federal regulation. The Court
said:
a comparison of the regulation with
the 1965 amendment indicates that they
protect overlapping, but not identical, gov-
ernmental interests and that they reach
somewhat different classes of wrongdoers. 1 3
This judicial recognition of the overlapping quality of the two federal poli-
cies in the draft card burning area supports the argument that Congress
evidenced a pre-emptive interest in the area.
The pervasiveness of the federal policy is highlighted further by refer-
ence to the narrow scope of the Illinois law. The Illinois statute prohibits
only the destruction or mutilation of a draft card. The federal statute has
prohibited this same conduct since 1965; however, it also goes far beyond
and prohibits the forgery or alteration of a draft card and even the mere
refusal to carry one.14 Certainly the pervasiveness of the Congressional
policy in the draft card area is at least as great, if not greater, than it was
in the sedition area where the Court has struck down state legislation.
i1. Dominance of Federal Interest
The Court in Nelson found that the dominance of the federal interest was
apparent in view of the "all embracing program"' 5 that the federal govern-
ment had enacted in the sedition area. In the draft card burning area the
dominance of federal interest is even more apparent.
The Constitution charges the federal government with the duty to pro-
vide for the national defense, and more specifically, Congress is given the
power to raise and support Armies. 16 The "War Power" includes the
power to establish a manpower registration system: "[the] power of Con-
gress to classify and conscript manpower is 'beyond question' . . . [and]
Congress may establish a system of registration for individuals liable for
1132 C.F.R. § 1617.1 (1962), amended January 1, 1968.
12 United States v. O'Brien, ____ U.S. _ _ 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968).
13 Id., at 680.
14See 50 U.S.C. §462 (1967).
15 350 U.S. at 504.
16 Article I, §8 of the UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
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training and service, and may require such individuals, within reason, to
cooperate with the registration system."1 7 A necessary corollary is that
Congress has the power to preserve and protect the registration system,
its procedures and certificates.' 8 Accordingly, it seems to follow that the
implementation and protection of the Congressionally established Selective
Service System is as much within the paramount federal area as national
defense itself.
The phrase "dominance of federal interest" implies a balance of state and
federal interests. The Supreme Court has recognized that where there is a
sufficient threat to the peace or security of the state, then federal and state
legislation on the same subject matter may co-exist even though similar.
In Uphaus v. Wyman' 9 the Supreme Court held that the federal sedition
statute did not pre-empt the field so as to prevent a state from en-
acting legislation regarding investigation of domestic subversive activi-
ties. The Court noted that the federal statute dealt with subversive activity
directed against the federal government while the state statute dealt with
subversion directed at the state itself.20 In the earlier case of Gilbert v.
Minnesota2 the Supreme Court upheld a conviction under a state statute
which made it illegal for ". . . any person in a public place ... to advocate
• . . that men should not enlist in the military forces . . . of the United
States or the state of Minnesota." 22 The Court felt that pre-emption did
not apply because of the local interest in preservation of the peace. 23 The
Court stressed that during the speech in controversy, "there were protest-
ing interruptions . . . accusations . . . threats . . . disorder and intimida-
tions of violence." 24
However, the rationale of neither of these cases is applicable in the draft
card burning area. In the first place the state has no interest in the pro-
17 United States v. O'Brien, supra note 12 at 680.
is Id.
19360 U.S. 72 (1959).
o Id., at 77.
21254 U.S. 325 (1920).
2 2 ld.
23 The court in Gilbert did not base its holding only on the "local interest" rationale.
For example, the court's language was very broad at 331:
We concur . . . that the state is not inhibited
from making the national purposes its own
purposes, to the extent of exerting its police
power to prevent its own citizens from obstruct-
ing the accomplishment of such purposes.
However, in the Nelson case at 501 the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted
the Gilbert case as turning only on the presence of a local interest. The Nelson
Court felt the Gilbert Court had concluded that the state act did not relate "to
the raising of armies for the national defense, nor to rules and regulations for
the governing of those under arms [a constitutionally exclusive federal power].
It [was] simply a local police measure."
24 Gilbert v. Minnesota, note 21 supra at 331.
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tection of the certificates themselves. 25 Draft cards serve a purely federal
function; they are printed at federal expense, distributed by a federal
agency,2 6 and required by Congress to insure a successful national defense
program. Thus the state's interest must stem from some concern with the
conduct itself. Unlike the sedition in Uphaus, draft card burning poses no
threat to the security of the state itself. It is a crime directed at the Na-
tional Government. It is not a protest of local policies; it is not directed
at local government. Likewise draft card burning does not seem to be an
internal threat sufficient to trigger the peace and order justification that
the Court found so persuasive in Gilbert.2 7 Admittedly the Illinois in-
terest in preventing breaches of the peace might be used to support a
"Draft Card Burning" Act. However, this state interest can be dismissed
as insufficient. First, the availability of other state laws to deal with any
disorders that arise reduces the state's need for this particular statute.
Second, the Illinois statute proscribes draft card burning in private as well
as in public. The former conduct is of no interest to the state since it poses
no threat to its peace or security. By contrast, as pointed out above, 2 8
the O'Brien Court felt that there was a strong federal interest in prevent-
ing draft card burning even if done in private. Furthermore, the Gilbert
case involved a statute that proscribed conduct only in a "public place."
Although neither Gilbert nor Nelson mentioned the factor at all, it is ar-
guable that such language supports an interpretation that the statute was
aimed more at a local interest than a national one. Thus the fact that
the Illinois "Draft Card Burning" Act is not limited to "public" conduct
weakens the argument that the statute was designed to deal solely with
local peace and order. It would thus appear that the federal interest in
the draft card area dominates whatever state interest exists.
IV. Conflict of Administration
In Nelson the Court observed: "should the states be permitted to exer-
cise a concurrent jurisdiction in the [sedition] area, federal enforcement
25 The O'Brien Court stated that a draft card served four purposes, all of which were
federal functions. These were:
1) Proof that the individual had registered for
the draft; 2) Facilitation of communication be-
tween the registrant and his local board; 3) a
reminder to the registrant to notify his local
board of any changes of address or condition;
and 4) easy detection of forgeries and altera-
tions. 20 L.Ed2d at 680.
It should be noted that such purposes would be thwarted equally by a private
or public burning of the draft card.26See 50 U.S.C. App. §460(a)(1) 1967).
"There is established in the executive branch of the government an agency to be
known as The Selective Service System . .
27 See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
28See note 25 supra.
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would encounter ... the difficulties ... [and] the added conflict engen-
dered by different criteria of substantive offenses." 2 9 The same holds true
in the draft card burning area. Where state and federal statutes are as
similar in wording and purpose as these are, adjudication by both state
and federal courts could produce differing results with attendant uncer-
tainty as to the substantive meaning of both statutes. As Mr. Justice
Jackson said in Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs, and Helpers Local Union
No. 776, "A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are
quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are
different rules of substantive law." 30 Dual enforcement can only lead to
contradictory enforcement. In an area as politically charged as draft card
burning the Justice Department may very well decide not to prosecute
particular violators. Such a decision, made by the departments charged
with insuring the defense of our Nation, ought not be subject to a possible
veto by each of the fifty states in their discretion.
V. Conclusion
In applying the Nelson tests to the draft card burning field it is clear
that the federal interest is manifest; that Congress has legislated broadly
and directly; and that a conflict in the administration of state and federal
laws could hamper the operation of the Selective Service System and con-
tradict the planned application of federal law. It would seem that Congress
has so occupied the field that any state interest which might exist would
be insufficient to support parallel regulation. The Illinois "Draft Card Burn-
ing" Act therefore seems unconstitutional.
29 350 U.S. at 509.
30 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953).
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